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POLLUTION CONTROL AT THE MARITIME
FRONTIER: THE LIMITS OF STATE
EXTRATERRITORIAL POWER
INTRODUCTION
The coastal states of our union hold a unique position in
the international community. By bordering on the oceans, they
receive all of the benefits and burdens that sea-borne com-
merce provides; yet because of our federal system, they lack the
power that all coastal nations wield to determine the territorial
extent to which they may control that commerce. The federal
government often extends its maritime borders for specific pur-
poses in order to regulate activities that affect the nation. Be-
cause the states lack this power, the extraterritorial applicabil-
ity of their laws holds great significance. This is particularly
true in the field of environmental protection.
California is currently grappling with the problem of con-
trolling extraterritorial polluters at sea. The waters beyond
California's three-mile limit support a variety of vessel traffic,
oil drilling platforms, and "lightering" operations' with pollu-
tant emissions that can have a significant impact on environ-
mental quality within the state. The state's inversion-prone
coastal basins are especially sensitive to air pollution originat-
ing at sea.2 In response to this problem, the California Air
Resources Board (ARB) has drafted a set of model rules to
be adopted by its regional districts that asserts jurisdiction to
regulate pollution sources located within "California Coastal
© 1979 by Peter M. Greenwald.
1. "Lightering" refers to the process of transferring to small ships the cargo from
a vessel that is too large-i.e., has too deep a draft-to enter ports itself. The lightering
of crude oil bound for United States refineries has increased dramatically in recent
years due primarily to the use of more economical supertankers. As the oil enters the
holds of the small "lighter" vessels, it displaces dense hydrocarbon fumes which have
accumulated there from previous trips. Prevailing seabreezes then transport these
gases to shore. P. Hess, Report on Tanker Lightering in San Francisco Bay (Sept.,
1977) (unpublished Bay Area Air Quality Management District report); L.A. Times,
Dec. 19, 1977 § 2, at 1, col. 5.
2. For example, in 1977, the state Air Resources Board estimated that, on some
days, up to 13% of the hydrocarbon pollutants in the San Diego area were created by
lightering operations occurring sixty-five miles from shore on the lee side of San Clem-
ente Island. The Board estimated that on days of maximum lightering activity, 118,000
pounds of hydrocarbon, sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxide, and particulate emissions were
created by such operations. L.A. Times, Dec. 19, 1977, § 2, at 1, col. 5.
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Waters"-a zone defined to extend up to seventy-five miles
from shore.'
The ARB Model Rule for the Control of Emissions from
Lightering Operations4 requires vessels lightering crude oil
within California Coastal Waters to use low sulfur fuel,5 sub-
stantially reduce loading emissions,' eliminate any operation
that would result in vapor release from cargo tanks,' and utilize
sealed monitoring instruments.' The Model New Source Re-
view Rules' require any new stationary source'" within the zone
to obtain permits indicating compliance with "best available
control technology"" and emissions offset'2 requirements.
3. "California Coastal Waters" means that area between the California coastline
and a line starting at the California-Oregon border at the Pacific Ocean.
Thence to 42.0 IN 125.5 'W
Thence to 41.0 IN 125.5 oW
Thence to 40.0 IN 125.5 oW
Thence to 39.0 °N 125.0 °W
Thence to 38.0 ON 124.5 OW
Thence to 37.0 ON 123.5 oW
Thence to 36.0 °N 122.5 oW
Thence to 35.0 ON 121.5 oW
Thence to 34.0 IN 120.5 oW
Thence to 33.0 °N 119.5 oW
Thence to 32.5 IN 118.5 OW
and ending at the California-Mexican border at the Pacific Ocean.
ARB, Model Rule for the Control of Emissions from Lightering Operations § (a)(1)
(July, 1978); ARB, Model New Source Review Rules, Rule I, § 1(2) (Feb. 16, 1979).
4. ARB, Model Rule for the Control of Emissions from Lightering Operations
(July, 1978).
5. Id. § (b)(1) (sulfur content may not exceed .5% by weight). This provision has
already been adopted by the South Coast Air Quality Management District. South
Coast Air Quality Management District Rule 1116.1 (b)(1) (Oct. 20, 1978).
6. After January 1, 1981, organic vapor loading emissions must be reduced by
95% from uncontrolled conditions. ARB, Model Rule for the Control of Emissions from
Lightering Operations § (c)(1) (July, 1978).
7. Id. § (d)(1).
8. Id. § (d)(2).
9. ARB, Model New Source Rules (Feb. 16, 1979).
10. " 'Stationary source' includes any structure, building, facility, equipment,
installation or operation (or aggregation thereof) which is located on one or more
bordering properties within the District .... " id. Rule I, § 1(4), "which are required
pursuant to District rules to obtain a permit to construct .... " id. § B(1), or which
result in a "net increase in emissions of 250 or more pounds during any day of any
pollutant for which there is a national ambient air quality standard . . .," id. §
B(2)(a). The Rule is intended to apply to structures within "California Coastal Wa-
ters." Telephone Conversation with Peter Hess, Bay Area Air Quality Management
District (March 21, 1979).
11. ARB, Model New Source Rules, Rule I, §§ D(1), I(1) (Feb. 16,1979), defining
best available control technology inter alia as the "most effective emissions control
technique which has been achieved in practice, for such category or class of
source. .. ."
12. Id. § D(2)(a), (b). Increased emissions of each pollutant for which a national
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Emissions within California Coastal Waters from vessels that
load or unload at the stationary source are considered to be
emissions from the stationary source.'3
The jurisdictional issues confronting states that attempt
to regulate extraterritorial maritime pollution sources are well
illustrated by the ARB model rules. In that context, this com-
ment examines the international law of jurisdiction over vessels
on the high seas, the constitutional limitations on state author-
ity beyond territorial waters, and the applicability of state en-
vironmental laws to drilling platforms and deepwater ports on
the outer continental shelf. It is concluded that the domestic
effects created by vessels polluting on the high seas provide a
valid jurisdictional basis for their regulation, and that such
state laws do not violate either international conventions or the
United States Constitution. State environmental laws are
found to be applicable to structures on the outer continental
shelf, but they can only be enforced by federal agencies.
JURISDICTION OVER VESSELS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW
Pollution, particularly air pollution, is a condition which
knows only the boundaries prescribed by nature. This transi-
tory character can frustrate efforts to deal with the problem
because of jurisdictional barriers to acquiring control over its
sources. The ARB's attempt to regulate lightering operations
up to seventy-five miles from shore is an excellent case in point.
The initial question raised is whether or not international mari-
time law, which "is a part of our law and as such is the law of
all the States of the Union,"" permits any arm of the United
States to regulate activities at such a distance from shore. The
emphasis must be on what international law currently allows
rather than what it should allow; as will be seen, the states may
not constitutionally affect foreign affairs. The various theories
of jurisdiction over vessels will be discussed, followed by an
examination of the Geneva Convention on the High Seas and
the possibility of controlling extraterritorial activities by condi-
tioning access to ports.
ambient air quality standard is exceeded in the air basin must be offset by reduced
emissions from existing stationary or nonstationary sources.
13. Id. § 1(4).
14. Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69, 72-73 (1941).
1979]
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Jurisdictional Theories
The Territorial Principle. According to presently codified
maritime law,'5 a country may regulate the conduct of vessels
of any nationality while they are within its territorial waters, 6
subject only to the vessel's right of "innocent passage."' 7 This
is the traditional territorial principle of jurisdiction.'" The
oceans beyond territorial waters are considered the high seas,
which no nation may subject to sovereignty. 9
Although much of the law of the sea has been internation-
ally ratified, attempts to set uniform territorial limits have
failed repeatedly. 0 Treaty negotiations have stumbled over the
fundamental conflict between countries favoring free naviga-
tion beyond the traditional three-mile limit, and those desiring
more extensive national boundaries for the preservation of their
coastal resources and environments.'
In the absence of international agreements, the reach of
territorial waters must be determined by each coastal nation.
In the United States, this function is reserved to the federal
15. The law of the sea is codified in four international conventions to which the
United States is a party: Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone,
done Apr. 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 1606, T.I.A.S. No. 5639, 516 U.N.T.S. 205; Convention
on the High Seas, done Apr. 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S. No. 5200, 450 U.N.T.S.
82; Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas,
done Apr. 29, 1958, 17 U.S.T. 138, T.I.A.S. No. 5969, 599 U.N.T.S. 285; Convention
on the Continental Shelf, done Apr. 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 471, T.I.A.S. No. 5578, 499
U.N.T.S. 312.
16. Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, supra note 15,
art. 17; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 17 (1965) [hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT].
17. Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, supra note 15,
art. 14, defining innocent passage as "navigation through the territorial sea" which is
"not prejudicial to the peace, good order, or security of the coastal State." Except for
fishing, the determination of what passage is innocent is left largely to the discretion
of the coastal states. Shelton & Rose, Freedom of Navigation: The Emerging Interna-
tional Regime, 17 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 523 (1977); RESTATEMENT, supra note 16, § 45.
18. See Harvard Research on International Law, Jurisdiction with Respect to
Crime, 29 AM. J. INT'L L. Supp. 435 (1935).
19. Convention on the High Seas, supra note 15, art. 2.
20. Three United Nations Conferences on the Law of the Sea, in 1958, 1960, and
1973, failed to resolve the issue. Sessions of the third conference are still taking place.
21. Exhaustion of resources along with progressing marine mining and fishing
technologies have enhanced the profitability of coastal waters-and the possibilities
for severe environmental damage. Intensified conflict over control of these areas has
resulted. The latest United Nations treaty negotiating text contains a compromise
solution involving a 200-mile "economic zone" within which coastal nations could
exercise minimum jurisdiction for resource and pollution control. Part V, Third United
Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, Informal Composite Negotiating Text, U.N.
Doc. A/CONF. 62/WP1O (1977); Shelton & Rose, supra note 17.
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government, 2  which generally recognizes the three-mile zone.23
Limited exceptions are provided for the control of fishing by
foreign vessels,24 ocean dumping, 21 oil discharges," customs en-
forcement, 7 and mining of continental shelf resources. 8
It is thus clear that the ARB Model Lightering Rule at-
tempts to regulate activities occurring beyond state and federal
territorial limits. It is also clear that the Rule may not bejustified as an exercise of territorial jurisdiction merely because
the lighter vessels eventually enter domestic waters. The mere
presence of persons within national boundaries does not of it-
self provide jurisdiction for the regulation of their extraterrito-
rial activities.2 Jurisdiction to prescribe a rule of law-subject
matter jurisdiction-must be distinguished from enforcement
or personal jurisdiction. 31 Under international law, "[a] state
does not have jurisdiction to enforce a rule of law prescribed by
it unless it had jurisdiction to prescribe the rule. ' ' 3' Constitu-
tional due process also requires that enforcement be predicated
22. The power to admit new states resides in Congress. The Presi-
dent, on the other hand, is the constitutional representative of the United
States in its dealings with foreign nations. From the former springs the
power to establish state boundaries; from the latter comes the power to
determine how far this country will claim territorial rights in the mar-
ginal sea as against other nations. Any such determination is, of course,
binding on the States.
United States v. Louisiana, 363 U.S. 1, 35 (1960); see text accompanying notes 91-97
infra.
23. United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19, 31-35 (1947).
24. Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976, 16 U.S.C. § 1811 (1976),
providing for a 200-mile "fishery conservation zone" in which foreign fishing is re-
stricted.
25. Ocean Dumping Act of 1972, §101(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1411 (1976), providing for
a 12-mile contiguous zone in which dumping of wastes from outside the United States
is restricted.
26. Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1977, 33 U.S.C.A. § 1321 (West
1978), prohibiting discharges of oil and hazardous substances "which may affect ...
resources . . . under the Fishery Conservation and Management Act," 16 U.S.C. §
1811 (1976), which provides for a 200-mile limit.
27. Anti-Smuggling Act of 1935, 19 U.S.C. § 1709(c), and Tariff Act of 1930, 19
U.S.C. § 1581 (1976), providing for a 12-mile zone in which the Coast Guard may
search and seize vessels for customs violations.
28. Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act of 1953, 43 U.S.C. § 1332 (1970), declar-
ing United States jurisdiction over the subsoil and seabed of the outer continental
shelf, which in some places in the Gulf of Mexico extends over 200 miles from shore.
Such jurisdiction has been internationally accepted in the 1958 Geneva Convention on
the Continental Shelf, supra note 15.
29. Rivard v. United States, 375 F.2d 882, 885 (5th Cir. 1967).
30. RESTATEMENT, supra note 16, § 7.
31. Id. § 7(2); 375 F.2d at 885.
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upon established principles of jurisdiction over the conduct in
question." The ARB Rule thus fails as an exercise of territorial
jurisdiction.
However, the territorial concept of jurisdiction is not an
exclusive characterization of the powers of countries to exercise
authority beyond their geographical boundaries. The law of
nations generally recognizes two relevant bases of jurisdiction
over persons acting beyond territorial limits: nationality juris-
diction and protective jurisdiction."
The Nationality Principle. As applied to vessels, the na-
tionality principle is embodied in the law of the flag-"perhaps
the most venerable and universal rule of maritime law.)3 4 It
provides that the sovereign whose flag the ship flies may exer-
cise authority over the vessel wherever it may be. 35 Each coun-
try may determine the conditions under which it will grant its
nationality to a merchant ship; it thereby accepts responsibil-
ity for and acquires control over the vessel. Nationality is evi-
denced to the world by the ship's papers and its flag. 3 The
principle developed from the necessity of applying some law
aboard ships on the high seas, where no nation may normally
exercise jurisdiction.
When vessels enter foreign waters and nationality jurisdic-
tion overlaps with territorial, the nationality principle must
yield.31 However, in the interest of maintaining consistent laws
on board ships calling at many ports, nations generally consent
to recognize the flag country's authority over all matters that
are strictly internal to the vessel. Any conditions or activities
that affect the port nation are subject to its regulation under
the longstanding "peace of the port doctrine."" Regulating pol-
lution from foreign vessels in domestic waters is thus consid-
ered to be a proper exercise of authority.39 However, application
of the peace of the port doctrine is limited to acts occurring
within territorial waters, and much pollution is emitted by
32. Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571 (1952).
33. See United States v. Rodriguez, 182 F. Supp. 479 (S.D. Cal. 1960), affirmed
sub nom. Rocha v. United States, 288 F.2d 545 (9th Cir. 1961).
34. 345 U.S. at 584.
35. Convention of the High Seas, supra note 15, art. 6.
36. 345 U.S. at 584.
37. Cunard v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 100 (1923).
38. The Wildenhus Case, 120 U.S. 1, 12 (1887); RESTATEMENT, supra note 16, §
50.
39. See, e.g., Ports and Waterways Safety Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1221-1227 (1976),
46 U.S.C. § 391a (1970); notes 131, 132 infra.
[Vol. 19
MARITIME POLLUTION
vessels of foreign registry while on the high seas. The lighters,
for example, although owned by American petroleum compa-
nies,40 have been registered in Liberia.
This practice of registering tankers in Liberia has become
commonplace in the American petroleum industry in order to
avoid stringent United States shipping laws. It is at the core
of many regulatory difficulties including the lightering prob-
lem. Liberia, Honduras, Panama, and other "flag of conveni-
ence" nations impose only nominal registration fees and taxes,
and virtually nonexistent safety, environmental, and labor reg-
ulations on their vessels.4 As a result, labor unrest and disas-
trous oil spills involving such ships have frequently occurred.42
Provisions of the Geneva Convention on the High Seas43 requir-
ing effective exercise of jurisdiction and control over vessels,
and a genuine link between countries and their ships, have
been all but ignored by the convenience flag nations.
Under international law, the existence of a genuine link
with the flag nation cannot be questioned by other countries."
Consistent with this view, no courts have allowed United
States regulation of a convenience flag ship on the ground that
it was actually of American nationality because of its domestic
ownership. 5 Convenience registrations have been accorded
minimal significance, however, in the separate field of civil
jurisdiction over seamen's tort claims."
40. Chevron U.S.A., Shell Oil Co., Coastal States Corp., Exxon.
41. See generally B. BOCZEK, FLAGS OF CONVENIENCE (1962).
42. Note, The Effects of United States Labor Legislation on the Flag of Conveni-
ence Fleet: Regulation of Shipboard Labor Relations and Remedies Against Shoreside
Picketing, 69 YALE L.J. 498 (1960); Lowe, The Enforcement of Marine Pollution
Regulations, 12 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 624, 633-34 (1975).
43. Convention on the High Seas, supra note 15, art. 5.
44. The Convention is unclear as to the result that follows if a genuine link does
not exist. But a provision that would have enabled countries other than the flag nation
to withhold recognition of a ship's nationality if they determined that there was no
genuine link between the ship and the flag nation was voted down at the Convention.
The legislative history by which the U.S. Senate gave its consent to ratification of the
Convention indicates that it believed that only an agreed-to tribunal, such as the
International Court of Justice, might have the authority to question the existence of a
genuine link. SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, LAw OF THE SEA CONVENTIONS, S.
EXEC. REP. No. 5, 86th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 106 CONG. REC. 11189, 11190
(1960); RESTATEMENT, supra note 16, § 28, Comment b.
45. RESTATEMENT, supra note 16, § 28, Reporters' Note 2(3)(c).
46. United States courts have occasionally pressed beyond nominal foreign regis-
tries to allow enforcement of comprehensive tort remedies provided by the Jones Act,
46 U.S.C. § 688 (1976), against American shipowners even though the tort occurred
on the high seas. In Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571 (1952), the Supreme Court
1979l
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The question of whether or not a foreign flag vessel could
be controlled on the high seas by regulating its American owner
is open to debate. According to the Second Restatement of
Foreign Relations Law, "[tihe state of nationality of the
owner has jurisdiction to prescribe, and to enforce within its
territory, rules governing the conduct of the owner, including
those relating to the operation of the vessel."4 The Restate-
ment's authors believe that the United States may control the
conduct of a foreign vessel even when it does not have jurisdic-
tion to prescribe rules directly applicable to the ship.48 As sup-
port for this proposition, the Restatement cites Lauritzen v.
Larsen,' where the Supreme Court said:
[The United States] is not debarred by any rule of inter-
national law from governing the conduct of its own citizens
upon the high seas or even in foreign countries when the
rights of other nations or their nationals are not infringed. 0
Lauritzen, however, dealt with civil jurisdiction," not ac-
tual regulation of foreign vessel operations. Piercing the law of
the flag under any rationale in order to control the equipment
and operations of foreign vessels on the high seas would seem
to be an infringement on the flag nation's rights. While there
is little to prevent an exercise of United States' authority over
foreign vessels, legislators and courts must consider the Su-
preme Court's warning in Lauritzen:
[I]n dealing with international commerce we cannot be
developed a balancing of contacts approach under which jurisdiction is asserted if
there is a substantial nexus between the tort and the United States. The lower courts
have often found such a nexus when foreign registration was a mere convenience to
avoid stringent United States shipping laws. E.g., Pandazapoulous v. Universal Cruise
Line, Inc., 365 F. Supp. 208 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Groves v. Universe Tankships, Inc., 308
F. Supp. 826 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Note, The Effect of United States Labor Legislation on
the Flag of Convenience Fleet: Regulation of Shipboard Labor Relations and Remedies
Against Shoreside Picketing, 69 YALE L.J. 498, 510-11 (1960). However, such applica-
tions of domestic law are valid under international law because a country has jurisdic-
tion to provide a civil forum and prescribe applicable law even though it does not
otherwise have a basis of jurisdiction with respect to the conduct giving rise to the
claim. RESTATEMENT, supra note 16, § 19.
47. RESTATEMENT, supra note 16, § 28, Comment c.
48. Id.
49. 345 U.S. 571 (1952).
50. Id. at 587, quoting Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69, 73 (1941).
51. See note 46 supra. Nor did any of the cases cited in Lauritzen deal with
regulation of vessel operations. Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280 (1952) (extra-
territorial trademark infringement); Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69 (1941) (extraterri-
torial taking of sponges).
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unmindful of the necessity for mutual forbearance if retal-
iations are to be avoided; nor should we forget that any
contact which we hold sufficient to warrant application of
our law to a foreign transaction will logically be as strong
a warrant for a foreign country to apply its law to an Amer-
ican transaction.52
That restraint must be exercised in applying United States
law to domestically owned foreign flag vessels was illustrated
in McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional,5 3 where the Supreme
Court refused to construe the National Labor Relations Act as
applying to several Honduran flag vessels. The NLRB had jus-
tified its assertion of jurisdiction on the fact that the ships had
substantial contacts with the United States, primarily, benefi-
cial ownership by an American corporation. The Court's under-
lying concern was that application of United States labor law
to foreign vessels through a case-by-case determination of
American contacts could lead to uncertainty and disruption of
international shipping. The Court distinguished its application
of American civil law to foreign vessels based on domestic con-
tacts4 by implying that enforcement of civil remedies does not
have the same potential for disruption of shipping because it
does not involve such pervasive regulation of the internal oper-
ation of foreign vessels. 55
Considerations similar to those articulated in McCulloch
argue against permitting environmental regulation of foreign
ships on the high seas under any rationale that looks to the
nationality of ownership. The difficulty of ascertaining the true
nationality of shipowners, who may be multi-national corpora-
tions or hidden under foreign subsidiaries," could lead to un-
certainty and overlapping applications of law by several coun-
tries in various contexts. The continued vitality of convenience
registrations attests to the unwillingness of American courts to
permit regulation of foreign vessels through their owners.
It is evident that the traditional jurisdictional tools can be
ineffectual in combating a problem as transient as pollution.
52. 345 U.S. at 582.
53. 372 U.S. 10 (1962).
54. See note 46 supra.
55. 372 U.S. at 19 n.9. Even in civil jurisdiction cases, however, the Court felt
that the law of the flag must be accorded great deference. Id.
56. Under some theories, the determination of corporate nationality depends on
factors that are changeable and often difficult to evaluate. RESTATEMENT, supra note
16, § 27, Comment c.
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Another theory has developed which bases jurisdiction not
upon the location or nationality of the actor, but upon the
effects of his actions. This protective jurisdiction, and similarly
based extension of the territorial principle of jurisdiction, offer
more positive possibilities for dealing with pollution originating
on the high seas.
The Protective Principle. Jurisdiction based upon the ef-
fects of an action can be traced doctrinally to Church v.
Hubbart, decided by the Supreme Court in 1804.11 There, Por-
tuguese authorities seized an American flag vessel on the high
seas for engaging in prohibited colonial trade. In upholding the
legality of the seizure, Chief Justice Marshall said:
[A nation's] power to secure itself from injury may cer-
tainly be exercised beyond the limits of its territory ...
[I]t has the right to use the means necessary for its pre-
vention. These means do hot appear to be limited within
any certain marked boundaries, which remain the same at
all times and in all situations. If they are such as unneces-
sarily to vex and harass foreign lawful commerce, foreign
nations will resist their exercise. If they are such as are
reasonable and necessary to secure their laws from viola-
tion, they will be submitted to.5
Although the source of this power has stirred debate," its exist-
ence cannot be denied. Christened the "protective principle of
jurisdiction,"10 it has become the basis for judicial approval of
immigration6 and customs" laws which are enforceable against
aliens acting extraterritorially, once they come within the
power of United States courts, either through extradition, vol-
untary entry, or arrest on the high seas pursuant to congres-
sional grants of authority. 3
Because protective jurisdiction is only asserted in those
cases involving threats to national security or governmental
functions, many extraterritorial activities having detrimental
57. 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 187 (1804).
58. Id. at 234.
59. See 13 STAN. L. REv. 155 (1960).
60. RESTATEMENT, supra note 16, § 33.
61. United States v. Pizzarusso, 388 F.2d 8 (2d Cir. 1968); Rocha v. United
States, 288 F.2d 545 (9th Cir. 1961).
62. The Reidun, 14 F. Supp. 771 (E.D.N.Y. 1936).
63. The President is authorized under 19 U.S.C. § 1701(a) (1976), to declare a
"customs enforcement area" in places on the high seas where ships are engaged in




domestic effects remain beyond its control. Only one jurisdic-
tional theory, the objective territorial principle, provides gov-
ernmental authority to regulate any extraterritorial conduct
that has a domestic effect.
The Objective Territorial Principle. This theory developed
as a response to the gap left by protective jurisdiction and
essentially broadens the scope of traditional territorial jurisdic-
tion. "Under the objective view, jurisdiction extends over all
acts which take effect within the sovereign even though the
author is elsewhere." 64 "Underlying this principle is the theory
that the detrimental effects constitute an element of the of-
fense and since they occur within the country, jurisdiction is
properly invoked under the territorial principle.""5
The leading international case involving objective terri-
torial jurisdiction is The S.S. Lotus,"6 decided by the Perma-
nent Court of International Justice in 1927. The court was
asked to determine whether Turkey had jurisdiction to prose-
cute a French seaman who had been arrested in Turkey for
allowing his French ship to collide with a Turkish vessel on the
high seas. The court upheld jurisdiction on the ground that the
Turkish vessel was an extension of Turkey itself and had been
detrimentally affected by defendant's extraterritorial actions
on the French ship."
In Strassheim v. Daily,"5 the Supreme Court clearly put
the United States among those nations adopting the objective
view of the territorial principle. As Justice Holmes stated:
Acts done outside a jurisdiction but intended to produce
and producing detrimental effects within it, justify a state
in punishing the cause of the harm as if he had been pres-
64. Rivard v. United States, 375 F.2d 882, 886 (5th Cir. 1967). See RESTATEMENT,
supra note 16, § 18.
65. United States v. Pizzarusso, 388 F.2d at 10.
66. [1927] P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 10; C. COLOMBOS, INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA
264-67 (1961).
67. Article 11(1) of the Geneva Convention on the High Seas, supra note 15,
supercedes the specific holding of the Lotus case that a vessel could be treated as
national territory for the purpose of acquiring jurisdiction based on territorial effects
in prosecutions of shipmasters for collisions on the high seas, by providing that juris-
diction in such a case belongs only to the flag nation or the country of which the
shipmaster is a national. However, the case is still universally cited for the proposition
that domestic effects create a valid basis of jurisdiction over extraterritorial conduct
under international law, and to that extent, it remains valid. RESTATEMENT, supra note
16, § 18, Reporters' Note 1.
68. 221 U.S. 280 (1911).
1979]
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ent at the effect, if the state should succeed in getting him
within its power."
Although Strassheim dealt with jurisdiction among the
states of the union, its holding was subsequently applied to
uphold a wide variety of statutes taking effect beyond the na-
tional borders. For example, the Sherman Antitrust Act was
applied by Judge Hand in United States v. Aluminum Com-
pany of America0 to cartel agreements made abroad by foreign
companies. He said that these agreements affected imports and
that "any state may impose liabilities even upon persons not
within its allegiance, for conduct outside its borders that has
consequences within its borders which the state reprehends."'
More recently, Deutsche Lufthansa Atkiengesellschaft v.
CAB7" upheld a Civil Aeronautics Board regulation requiring
foreign air carriers to print liability limitations on tickets is-
sued abroad. The court stated that "Congress may regulate the
conduct of non-citizens, even if that conduct takes place in a
foreign country, if the consequences of the conduct are felt
within the United States."7 3
The preceding cases clearly indicate that there is no bar
under contemporary international law to enforcing civil or
criminal penalties for extraterritorial conduct by aliens that
causes territorial detriment. As indicated in The S.S. Lotus,
this principle may be used to acquire subject matter jurisdic-
tion over acts on foreign ships beyond territorial waters. Al-
though there is no authority for extraterritorial police action to
enforce such laws, this does not pose a significant practical
difficulty in the case of environmental controls on vessels. The
vast majority of ships that would be affected by such laws are
American-owned or will enter the jurisdiction and thus be sub-
ject to enforcement penalties. Furthermore, if the parties are
69. Id. at 285.
70. 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
71. Id. at 443; for a collection of antitrust cases involving alien corporations, see
Note, Limitations on the Federal Judicial Power to Compel Acts Violating Foreign
Law, 63 COLUM. L. REv. 1441 (1963).
72. 479 F.2d 912 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
73. Id. at 917; accord, CAB v. British Airways Board, 433 F. Supp. 1379
(S.D.N.Y. 1977) (CAB rate regulation held applicable to fares collected in Britain by
British airline); cf. Ford v. United States, 273 U.S. 593, 619-24 (1926) (prosecution for
smuggling liquor from vessel beyond three-mile limit); Rivard v. United States, 372
F.2d 882 (5th Cir. 1967) (aliens prosecuted for extraterritorially conspiring to smuggle
narcotics into the country); Main v. United States, 352 F.2d 174 (5th Cir. 1965) (aliens
prosecuted for extraterritorially conspiring to smuggle narcotics into the country).
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subject to in personam jurisdiction, there is no bar to injunc-
tions taking effect on the high seas beyond the court's jurisdic-
tion.7" Thus, although no regulations of pollution sources lo-
cated beyond territorial waters have been reviewed by the
courts,75 the precedents would appear to strongly favor their
jurisdictional validity.
Geneva Convention on the High Seas
Even if a valid jurisdictional basis for regulating the extra-
territorial operations of vessels is found, there is an issue of
whether or not its exercise would violate the Geneva Conven-
tion on the High Seas.7" As with all treaties, the Convention is
binding upon the states by virtue of the Supremacy Clause of
the United States Constitution. 7" Article 2 of the Convention
states: "The high seas being open to all nations, no state may
validly purport to subject any part of them to its sovereignty."7
Article 6 states: "Ships shall sail under the flag of one State
only and . . . shall be subject to its exclusive jurisdiction on
the high seas."79
It is doubtful whether invoking the objective territorial
principle could be considered an exercise of sovereignty over
international waters, or a prohibited assertion of jurisdiction
over vessels while on the high seas. A distinction must again
be made between prescriptive jurisdiction and enforcement
jurisdiction10 The United States may regulate the conduct of
persons within a foreign country under the nationality or objec-
tive territorial principles, yet without enforcement power in the
foreign country, such regulation could hardly be considered to
subject foreign territory to United States sovereignty. In The
S.S. Lotus,8 the Permanent Court of International Justice spe-
cifically held that territorial enforcement of an extraterritorial
74. New Jersey v. City of New York, 283 U.S. 473, 482 (1931).
75. But cf. The Trail Smelter Arbitration (United States v. Canada), 3 R. Int'l
Arb. Awards 1905, 35 Am. J. Int'l L. 684 (1941) (Canada held responsible under inter-
national law for damage done in the United States by atmospheric pollution originat-
ing from a smelter plant in Canada); Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496, 520-21 (1906)
(indicating that a state might have a remedy against a sister state for pollution of the
former's river).
76. Convention on the High Seas, supra note 15.
77. U.S. CONST. art. VI; Hauenstein v. Lynham, 100 U.S. 483 (1880).
78. Convention on the High Seas, supra note 15, art. 2.
79. Id. art. 6.
80. See text accompanying note 30 supra.
81. [1927] P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 10; notes 66, 67 supra.
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statute was not an illegal exercise of jurisdiction over foreign
vessels while on the high seas. Although the Lotus decision
predated the Convention on the High Seas, the principle
should remain valid today since the Convention basically codi-
fied prior law. 2 Thus, in order to be consistent with general
principles of jurisdictional law, the Convention should be con-
strued to merely prohibit enforcement jurisdiction on the high
seas.
Resolution of the issue of compliance with the Convention
must ultimately hinge upon international policy considera-
tions. But the ramifications of upholding objective territorial
jurisdiction over vessels polluting on the high seas are, for sev-
eral reasons, relatively slight. First, all countries may currently
impose design or equipment restrictions upon ships voluntarily
entering their waters. Such regulations obviously have sub-
stantial extraterritorial effects. Objective territorial jurisdic-
tion merely extends this power to the control of the activities
of such vessels-a far lesser impact than equipment restric-
tions. Second, the interference with high seas commerce is kept
to a minimum because only those activities that cause terri-
torial detriment may be controlled. The requirement of terri-
torial effects also prevents overreaching and overlapping regu-
lation by several states or nations. Third, the requirement of
territorial enforcement means that only those vessels voluntar-
ily entering domestic waters and ports may be regulated. This
prevents countries from promulgating laws that overly burden
sea-borne commerce by ensuring that they will suffer economi-
cally. Finally, as the lightering case illustrates, foreign flag
nations often lack sufficient familiarity or interest with local
pollution problems to effectively deal with them. Accordingly,
the courts should uphold objective territorial jurisdiction over
polluters on the high seas as a relatively minor intrusion on
commerce, and a significant step towards worldwide pollution
control.
Consent to Regulation
Another potential means of controlling the extraterritorial
activities of foreign vessels, although not technically
"jurisdiction," is the imposition of certain conditions on their
right to utilize domestic ports. While vessels of all nations have
82. RESTATEMENT, supra note 16, at 32.
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the right of innocent passage through territorial waters," in
Patterson v. Bark Eudora,84 the Supreme Court said that
the implied consent to permit them to enter our harbors
may be withdrawn, and if this implied consent may be
withdrawn, it may be extended upon such terms and con-
ditions as the government sees fit to impose. 5
Under this theory, the lighters would "voluntarily" comply
with the ARB Rule on the high seas in order to utilize port
facilities. There is theoretically no limit to what activities may
be made conditions of entry, or where they may be required to
be performed.
It is quite possible, however, that this deceptively simple
principle does not exist at all. In Patterson, the Court held that
a federal statute prohibiting wage advances governed pay-
ments made by foreign ships while in domestic ports. The
Court's discussion on conditions of entry has been quoted in a
number of cases, notably Cunard v. Mellon" and Strathearn
S.S. Co. v. Dillon,87 where the Court similarly held foreign
vessels subject to federal liquor prohibition and wage allowance
statutes while in American ports. In each case, the applicabil-
ity of the statutes was initially determined according to cus-
tomary principles of territorial jurisdiction. Although subse-
quent dicta in the opinions stated that Congress has the power
to condition access to ports, it becomes evident upon careful
reading of the cases that this was not a separate basis for up-
holding application of the statutes. The "conditions of entry"
were compliance with the territorial regulations. Although en-
forcement of the statutes incidentally impaired foreign con-
tracts or carriage of liquor, their application was nevertheless
a legitimate exercise of territorial jurisdiction. In no case has
the alleged condition of entry directly regulated extraterritorial
conduct, as does the ARB Rule.88
83. See note 17 supra.
84. 190 U.S. 169 (1902).
85. Id. at 177.
86. 262 U.S. 100 (1923).
87. 252 U.S. 348 (1919).
88. But see Armement Deppe v. United States, 399 F.2d 794 (5th Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 1094 (1969), in which collusive rate contracts executed abroad by
foreign flag shippers were held to be governed by the Shipping Act of 1916, 46 U.S.C.
§ 813a (1976). The opinion reiterated congressional power to condition access to Ameri-
can ports, and did not clearly discuss jurisdiction over the subject matter. The court
felt, however, that the decision hinged upon a finding that the unfair contracts were
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The Restatement8' does not recognize this method of con-
trolling vessels, perhaps because imposing conditions of entry
is virtually indistinguishable from actual regulation. This simi-
larity dictates that conditions of entry should only be used to
control activities that would be within the reach of customary
principles of jurisdictional law. Resorting to this fiction should
therefore rarely be justified.
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS ON STATE AUTHORITY
Our federal government is composed of enumerated pow-
ers which the Constitution delegates to it from the states. The
sovereign authority of the states to exercise these powers is
accordingly diminished. The extent of this diminishment in
sovereign power must be analyzed to determine whether the
states may regulate extraterritorial conduct as the federal gov-
ernment may. State jurisdictional authority, power to affect
foreign affairs, and power to regulate foreign commerce will be
examined.
State Jurisdiction at Sea
State Territorial Limits. Prior to 1947 it was generally as-
sumed that the states possessed absolute sovereign power to
determine the breadth of their territorial seas.'0 Beginning in
1947, the Supreme Court reversed this assumption in a series
of cases, United States v. California," United States v.
Louisiana," and United States v. Texas," in which the federal
government sought declarations of its exclusive right to control
exploitation of the continental shelf. The Court held that the
states had no valid claim to ownership of the seabed beyond
the low water mark and that "paramount rights" over the
ocean floor were vested in the federal government. The deci-
sions were based partly on a historical analysis and partly on
the importance of the oceans to national security and other
to be carried out in commerce with the United States. The holding is thus justifiable
under the objective territorial principle.
89. RESTATEMENT, supra note 16.
90. See, e.g., People v. Stralla, 14 Cal. 2d 617, 630, 96 P.2d 941,947 (1939), where
the court said: "[Tihe 'jurisdiction of the State of California over the sea is that of
an independent nation' [citation omitted], with the right to decide and prescribe its
own boundaries."
91. 332 U.S. 19 (1947).
92. 339 U.S. 699 (1950).
93. 339 U.S. 707 (1950).
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federal interests. 4 Although these cases specifically concerned
title to the seabed, the reasoning is equally applicable to the
waters above, and in fact, the Court has recently reinterpreted
the cases as establishing that "paramount rights over the ocean
waters and their seabed were vested in the Federal Govern-
ment." 5
As an exercise of its paramount authority, Congress passed
the Submerged Lands Act of 1953,"1 which set the outer bound-
aries of the coastal states at three miles from shore, 7 a limit
which the California Constitution claims." The federal govern-
ment retains its paramount authority over the waters and
seabed beyond the three-mile limit since the Act did not pur-
port to affect rights to those areas."
As with any nation, it is clear that coastal states may
exercise their full jurisdictional powers within their territorial
waters."0 It is also clear from Strassheim v. Daily"°1 that the
states may exercise objective territorial jurisdiction over per-
sons acting in other states of the union. The question that
remains is whether or not the states, upon entering the union,
94. The Court said:
California, like the thirteen original colonies, never acquired ownership
in the marginal sea. The claim to our three-mile belt was first asserted
by the national government. Protection and control of the area are indeed
functions of national external sovereignty. 332 U.S. pp. 31-34. The mar-
ginal sea is a national, not a state concern. National interests, national
responsibilities, national concerns are involved. The problems of com-
merce, national defense, relations with other powers, war and peace focus
there. National rights must therefore be paramount in that area.
339 U.S. at 704.
95. United States v. Maine, 420 U.S. 515, 520 (1975) (emphasis added).
96. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1315 (1976).
97. Id. § 1312, which makes no distinction between, and is apparently applicable
to, ocean jurisdictional boundaries as well as seabed title. See also id. §§ 1301(e),
1311(a) (giving states title to fish and other water borne resources); United States v.
Louisiana, 420 U.S. 529, 530 (1975) (decree directing determination of "the extent of
territorial waters under the jurisdiction of the State of Louisiana pursuant to the
Submerged Lands Act. ... ). But see People v. Foretich, 14 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 6,
92 Cal. Rptr. 481 (1970) (discussed in note 98 infra).
98. CAL. CONST. art. XXI, § 1, as clarified by CAL. GOv'T CODE § 170 (West 1966).
Across certain bays, the California Constitution claims somewhat more than three
miles. In People v. Foretich, 14 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 6, 92 Cal. Rptr. 481 (1970), the
court held that the state retains "political" jurisdiction over these areas, although not
title. See also note 107 infra.
99. 43 U.S.C. § 1302 (1976).
100. Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948); Corsa v. Tawes, 149 F. Supp. 771
(D. Md. 1957).
101. 221 U.S. 280 (1911); see text accompanying notes 68, 69 supra.
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gave up the power to exercise jurisdiction beyond the borders
of the United States.
State Extraterritorial Power. The Supreme Court has said
that each state is competent to exert "that residuum of sover-
eignty not delegated to the United States by the Constitution
itself." 2 As to jurisdictional powers, it appears from Skiriotes
v. Florida"0 3 that the extent of state sovereign power delegated
to the federal government is very little indeed.
In Skiriotes, a Florida skin diver was found to have vio-
lated a state regulation prohibiting the use of diving equipment
in collecting sponges. The diver contended that the regulation
could not be applied to his activities because they occurred
beyond the three-mile limit. The Supreme Court disagreed,
basing its opinion on the nationality principle of jurisdiction:
If the United States may control the conduct of its citizens
upon the high seas, we see no reason why the State of
Florida may not likewise govern the conduct of its citizens
upon the high seas with respect to matters in which the
State has a legitimate interest and where there is no con-
flict with acts of Congress. Save for the powers committed
by the Constitution to the Union, the State of Florida has
retained the status of a sovereign.'
Skiriotes has been broadly interpreted by a number of
state and lower federal courts which have sustained state regu-
lations of fishing on the high seas. Earlier cases had upheld
indirect regulation of extraterritorial fishing in the form of
"landing laws"-prohibitions on possession within the state of
protected sealife taken beyond state waters. 05 After Skiriotes,
direct controls on high seas fishing were upheld, even to the
point of permitting extraterritorial arrests.
In People v. Foretich,101 the California Court of Appeals
upheld the prosecution of California citizens for fishing with
purse seine nets in a statutorily prohibited area between three
and twelve miles from shore.0 7 In Felton v. Hodges, 10s the Fifth
102. Coyle v. Oklahoma, 221 U.S. 559, 567 (1911).
103. 131 U.S. 280 (1941).
104. Id. at 77.
105. For a discussion, see State v. Bundrant, 546 P.2d 530, 551-52 (Alas.), appeal
dismissed, 429 U.S. 806 (1976).
106. -14 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 6, 92 Cal. Rptr. 481 (1970); see also 34 Ops. CAL.
ATr'Y GEN. 260 (1959) (state regulation of extraterritorial ocean waste discharges by
California citizens is valid).
107. The court was of the opinion that California retained "political" jurisdiction
over the area in question, see note 98 supra, but it held that under Skiriotes, the
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Circuit upheld the arrest on the high seas of a Florida citizen
for violating Florida statutes that regulated the taking of craw-
fish. And in State v. Bundrant'°1 and State v. Sieminski, 110 the
Alaska Supreme Court sustained arrests that occurred both
within and beyond the three-mile limit for violations of state
laws which prohibited the taking of crabs and scallops in speci-
fied areas of the high seas during certain seasons. Although the
defendants had regular contacts with Alaska, most, including
those arrested on the high seas, were not state citizens.
Two requisites for constitutional validity were stated in
each case: first, the regulation served a legitimate state pur-
pose, usually protection of marine life and fishing industries
within the state by preventing depletion of migratory species
while they were beyond territorial waters; second, the statutes
were only enforced against those loosely defined as state citi-
zens: persons having a certain minimum relationship with the
state, such as residency, possession of state licenses, or regular
use of state ports and markets.'
The Skiriotes line of cases indicates that the states may
regulate the conduct of their citizens beyond territorial limits
pursuant to the nationality principle of jurisdiction. ' Extra-
territorial pollution regulation of domestic vessels owned by
state citizens or those having significant state contacts is thus
a valid exercise of authority. However, as was noted earlier,
extraterritorial regulation of locally owned foreign flag vessels
would impinge upon the flag country's rights and thus should
not be justified as an exercise of nationality jurisdiction over
shipowners."' Jurisdiction over foreign vessels could, however,
regulations were valid even if proscribing conduct beyond state waters. 14 Cal. App.
3d Supp. at 14-15, 92 Cal. .Rptr. at 486-87.
108. 374 F.2d 337 (5th Cir. 1967).
109. 546 P.2d 530 (Alas.), appeal dismissed, 429 U.S. 806 (1976).
110. 556 P.2d 929 (Alas. 1976).
111. Id. at 933; see also Jacobson v. Maryland Racing Comm'n, 261 Md. 180, 274A.2d 102 (1971) (resale prohibitions applicable to purchaser of horses in Maryland who
resold in other states since he had become a "racing citizen of Maryland" by virtue of
state licensing and other contacts).
112. "ITIhe sovereign authority of the state over the conduct of its citizens upon
the high seas is analogous to the sovereign authority of the United States over its
citizens in like circumstances." People v. Foretich, 14 Cal. App. 3d Supp. at 14, 92
Cal. Rptr. at 486; see also The Hamilton, 207 U.S. 398, 403 (1907), where it was said:[T]he bare fact of the parties being outside the territory in a place
belonging to no other sovereign would not limit the authority of the State
[of Delaware], as accepted by civilized theory. No one doubts the power
of England or France to govern their own ships upon the high seas.
113. See text accompanying notes 47-56 supra.
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be obtained pursuant to the objective territorial principle. If
the states have retained a sufficient "residuum of sovereignty"
to exercise nationality jurisdiction on the high seas, they
should be free to invoke the objective territorial principle
which, due to its requirements of territorial effects and enforce-
ment, would seem to constitute a lesser exercise of external
sovereignty.
Still to be determined is whether or not the Constitution
prohibits the states from regulating external affairs that in-
volve foreign relations and commerce.
State Intrusion Into Foreign Affairs
Like the Commerce Clause, the foreign affairs clauses of
the United States Constitution"' delegate powers to the na-
tional government and carve out an exclusive federal domain
in which state police powers are implicitly restricted."' State
legislation may not constitute "an intrusion by the State into
the field of foreign affairs which the Constitution entrusts to
the President and the Congress.""' The recognition of this re-
striction on state authority is a relatively new development and
its parameters remain largely undefined.
In the leading case of Zschernig v. Miller, "' the Supreme
Court invalidated an Oregon escheat statute which had more
than" 'some incidental or indirect effect in foreign countries,' "
it had "great potential for disruption or embarrassment" of our
foreign policies.'18 Louis Henkin suggests that this indicates an
analysis similar to that under the Commerce Clause:
[C]ertain impingements on foreign affairs are excluded
because national uniformity is required; infringements are
barred if they discriminate against or unduly burden our
foreign relations; the Courts will balance the State's inter-
est in a regulation against the impact on American foreign
relations."'
To the extent that state environmental laws are applied to
114. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1, cl. 3; id. art. I, § 10, id. art. II, § 2; id. art. VI.
115. "Governmental power over external affairs is not distributed, but is vested
exclusively in the national government." United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 330
(1937).
116. Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 432 (1968).
117. Id.
118. Id. at 434-35.
119. L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 241 (1972).
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ships on the high seas, particularly those flying foreign flags,
they must be deemed to affect the nation's foreign affairs. Nev-
ertheless, such laws should be upheld if carefully circumscribed
to be nondiscriminatory, consistent with international law,
serve a legitimate state purpose, and avoid regulating equip-
ment in a manner contradictory to other jurisdictions which
the vessels might enter.2 0 Although specific state regulations
will vary, the ARB Model Lightering Rule appears to comport
with these conditions.
A final issue is whether or not the federal government's
paramount authority over the oceans beyond territorial waters
might preclude state regulation there. However, as was indi-
cated in Skiriotes, the national government's authority over
the oceans may be paramount, but it is not exclusive.
State Regulation of Foreign Commerce
The Commerce Clause of the United States Constitutionlzl
reserves to the federal government the power to regulate inter-
state and foreign commerce, and implicitly prohibits such reg-
ulation by the states. Although a relatively clear picture of the
limitation on state regulation of interstate commerce has
emerged, very few cases have dealt with state regulation of
foreign commerce. Nevertheless, as one commentator has
noted, "nothing in the cases suggests, and there is no reason
to believe, that they and the various doctrines do not apply
equally to foreign commerce.' 22
In Huron Portland Cement Co. v. Detroit,2 3 the Supreme
Court, in upholding the application of a local smoke abatement
ordinance to vessels plying the Great Lakes in interstate com-
merce, 24 explained the basic limitations on local power in this
area:
Evenhanded local regulation to effectuate a legitimate
120. See Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 180 (1978), where the
Supreme Court indicated in dicta that a state tanker regulation which required such
integral design features as double bottoms, twin screws, and specific engine horsepower
might constitute an invalid interference with the federal government's attempts to
achieve international agreement on the regulation of tanker design.
121. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
122. L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 236 (1972).
123. 362 U.S. 440 (1959).
124. Although the opinion only stated that interstate commerce was involved, it
is likely that Detroit's ordinance was also applied to vessels in foreign commerce with
Canada and other nations.
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local public interest is valid unless ...unduly burden-
some on maritime activities or interstate commerce ...
In determining whether the state has imposed an
undue burden on interstate commerce, it must be borne in
mind that the Constitution when "conferring upon Con-
gress the regulation of commerce, . . . never intended to
cut the States off from legislating on all subjects relating
to the health, life, and safety of their citizens, though the
legislation might indirectly affect the commerce of the
country. Legislation, in a great variety of ways, may affect
commerce and persons engaged in it without constituting
a regulation of it, within the meaning of the Constitution.
But a state may not impose a burden which materially
affects interstate commerce in an area where uniformity of
regulation is necessary .... 125
Lightering regulations such as the ARB Model Rule would
appear to comply with these requirements. Air pollution cre-
ated by lightering is a local, not national, problem. The unique-
ness of local meteorological conditions makes uniform emis-
sions standards unnecessary. Uniform equipment regulations
are also unnecessary since lightering operations involve only
the ports of one state. Lighters face compliance costs which are
minimal considering the size and expenses of the petroleum
industry, and which are probably not so great as to reduce
deliveries of oil-thus negating any inference of undue burden
under a test recently articulated by the Supreme Court. 2
Local lightering rules should thus readily pass constitutional
muster, particularly in light of their benefits to "health, life
and safety."
Federal Preemption
The modern law of air pollution control is governed largely
by the federal Clean Air Act.2 7 The Act establishes a compre-
hensive scheme for regulating emissions from stationary and
vehicular sources. Vessels are not covered, 28 and with a few
125. 362 U.S. at 443-44.
126. The Supreme Court recently held that a similarly restrictive Washington
State tanker regulation did not constitute an undue burden on commerce after noting
that the cost of compliance with it was insignificant compared to the size of the
industry, and that the amount of oil refined had not declined since passage of the law.
Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 179-80 (1978); see text accompanying note
135 infra.
127. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 7401-7642 (West Supp. Pamph. 1977).
128. Id. § 7550(2).
[Vol. 19768
MARITIME POLLUTION
exceptions,' federal preemptive powers are restricted by the
proviso that "nothing in this Act shall preclude or deny the
right of any State or political subdivision thereof to adopt or
enforce . . . any requirements respecting control or abatement
of air pollution."130 It seems clear, therefore, that the Clean Air
Act does not preclude the states from regulating atmospheric
emissions from vessels. However, there are other federal stat-
utes regulating oil tankers which must be considered.
Title I of the Ports and Waterways Safety Act of 1972'1'
establishes a federal scheme for regulating the operations,
traffic routes, and pilotage of tankers. Title II'll empowers the
Coast Guard to regulate design, construction, and maintenance
of tankers operating in United States waters. The introductory
clause of Title I states that its primary purpose is "to protect
the navigable waters and resources therein from environmental
harm resulting from vessel or structure damage."' '
The preemptive effect of the Ports and Waterways Safety
Act was recently litigated in connection with a Washington
state statute. By enacting the Washington Tanker Act,' 3 the
state legislature sought to protect the waters of Puget Sound
by prohibiting large supertankers, requiring others to take on
a local pilot in the sound, and specifying minimum design fea-
tures, a requirement which could be waived if the tanker was
accompanied by a tug escort. In Ray v. Atlantic Richfield
Co., 35 the Supreme Court ruled that the state design restric-
tions and some of the pilotage requirements were preempted by
the federal statute. While exhibiting great deference to the
state police power, the Court noted that the ends which both
statutes sought were identical, that complying with both would
be impossible at times, and that "Congress intended uniform
national standards for design and construction of tankers that
would foreclose the imposition of different or more stringent
state requirements.' ' 3 The Court did state, however, that
the mere fact that a vessel has been inspected and found
to comply with the Secretary's vessel safety regulations
129. Id. §§ 7543(a) (new motor vehicles), 7545(c)(4) (fuels), 7573 (aircraft).
130. Id. § 7416.
131. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1221-1227 (1976).
132. 46 U.S.C. § 391a (1970).
133. 33 U.S.C. § 1221 (1976).
134. WASH. Rv. CODE § 88.16.170 (Supp. 1976).
135. 435 U.S. 151 (1978).
136. Id. at 163.
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does not prevent a state or city from enforcing local laws
having other purposes, such as a local smoke abatement
law.13 7
The Court thus specifically distinguished and reaffirmed
its holding in Huron Portland Cement Co. v. Detroit, 3 a case
directly analogous to the lightering situation. There, the Coast
Guard, pursuant to federal statutes, inspected and licensed
vessels to ensure their safety. The city of Detroit then enacted
a smoke abatement ordinance which was applicable to vessels
in its port. Compliance with the ordinance required equipment
modifications on vessels previously approved by the Coast
Guard. In holding that the ordinance was not preempted by
federal law, the Court found "no overlap between the scope of
the federal ship inspection laws and that of the municipal ordi-
nance," '3 stating: "the purpose of the federal inspection stat-
utes is to insure the seagoing safety of vessels subject to inspec-
tion. . . . By contrast, the sole aim of the Detroit ordinance is
the elimination of air pollution. ... "I40 As the dissent pointed
out, the effects of the two laws were clearly at odds. The city
was authorized to impound the same vessels which the Coast
Guard had approved and licensed for use. The Court based its
decision instead upon the purposes of the two laws being inde-
pendent and largely compatible.
Similarly, in the lightering situation, a local air pollution
district may find that its regulations prohibit equipment or
activities approved by the Coast Guard. Yet there is no actual
conflict between the laws because their purposes differ and the
pollution districts recognize the Coast Guard's paramount au-
thority in its field; section (e)(1) of the ARB Model Lightering
Rule provides: "Nothing in this Rule shall be construed to...
(r)equire any act or omission that would be in violation of any
regulation or other requirement of the United States Coast
Guard.""' This clearly satisfies the principle espoused by the
Court in Kelly v. Washington"' that an exercise of police power
is only superseded by federal action when "the repugnance or
137. Id. at 164.
138. 362 U.S. 440 (1960).
139. Id. at 446.
140. Id. at 445.
141. ARB, Model Rule for the Control of Emissions from Lightering Operations
§ (e)(1) (July, 1978).
142. 302 U.S. 1 (1937) (also reaffirmed by Ray).
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conflict is 'so direct and positive' that the two acts cannot 'be
reconciled or consistently stand together.' "
In the absence of direct conflict, state authority may still
be preempted if the federal statute evidences congressional in-
tent to wholly occupy the field. In Huron, although the Court
observed that the federal statutes were an "extensive and com-
prehensive set of controls over ships and shipping,'" it never-
theless found that Congress had not intended to wholly occupy
the field of vessel regulation. This was so because the federal
laws were limited in purpose to safety, and because there had
been congressional declarations of policy to "preserve and pro-
tect the primary responsibilities and rights of the States and
local governments in controlling air pollution.""' 5 That policy
continues today in section 101 of the Clean Air Act."' In addi-
tion, the Court in Huron pointed out that air pollution control
clearly falls within the exercise of even the most traditional
concept of what is compendiously known as the police
power. In the exercise of that power, the States and their
instrumentalities may act in many areas of interstate com-
merce and maritime activities, concurrently with the fed-
eral government." 7
OFFSHORE STRUCTURES
State regulation of extraterritorial oil drilling platforms
and deepwater ports"" presents jurisdictional issues that are
quite dissimilar from those raised in regulating vessels; they
are also less complex. The outer continental shelf, unlike the
high seas, is subject to limited national sovereignty under in-
ternational law. The Geneva Convention on the Continental
Shelf" ' provides each coastal nation with jurisdiction to ex-
plore and exploit the resources of the shelf within the zone
where the depth of the superadjacent waters permits such ac-
tivities. Coastal nations are given authority to construct struc-
tures necessary for such exploration and exploitation.5'
143. Id. at 10.
144. 362 U.S. at 444.
145. 69 Stat. 322 (1955).
146. 42 U.S.C.A. § 7401(a)(3) (West Supp. Pamph. 1978).
147. 362 U.S. at 442.
148. Deepwater ports are fixed or floating offshore structures that are used to
receive oil from supertankers which are too large to enter harbors. S. REP. No. 93-1217,
93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 5-7, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 7533-35.
149. Convention on the Continental Shelf, supra note 15, art. 2.
150. Id. art. 5. Such structures do not have the legal status of islands nor a
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As was noted earlier, Congress has permitted the states to
extend their authority over the oceans, including structures,
within three miles from shore.' 5' Beyond this zone, the Outer
Continental Shelf Lands Act of 1953 (OCSLA)'II confirms that
the laws and Constitution of the United States apply to the
seabed and structures erected thereon for the purpose of re-
source exploitation.'5 3 Fixed and floating ports located beyond
territorial limits are brought under federal authority by the
Deepwater Port Act of 1974 (DPA),'4 although such jurisdic-
tion is not presently authorized by international law.'55 The
waters beyond territorial limits retain their status as high
seas.1SO
The applicability of state laws to structures beyond the
three-mile limit is restricted in a similar manner by the
OCSLA and the DPA.' 5 Both acts provide that to the extent
they are applicable and not inconsistent with federal laws, the
civil and criminal laws of the nearest coastal states are declared
to be the law of the United States for structures located directly
territorial sea of their own, although 500-meter "safety zones" are authorized. Id.
151. Submerged Lands Act of 1953, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1315 (1970); note 97 supra.
152. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1343 (1976), as amended by Outer Continental Shelf Act
Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-372, 92 Stat. 629.
153. Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-
372, § 203, 92 Stat. 629 (amending 43 U.S.C. § 1333(a)(1)), which provides:
The Constitution and laws and civil and political jurisdiction of the
United States are extended to the subsoil and seabed of the outer Conti-
nental Shelf and to all artificial islands, and all installations and other
devices permanently or temporarily attached to the seabed, which may
be erected thereon for the purpose of exploring for, developing, or produc-
ing resources therefrom, or any such installation or other device (other
than a ship or vessel) for the purpose of transporting such resources, to
the same extent as if the outer Continental Shelf were an area of exclusive
Federal jurisdiction located within a State: provided, however, that min-
eral leases on the outer Continental Shelf shall be maintained or issued
only under the provisions of this subchapter.
Structures not designed for resource exploitation are not covered by the Act or the
Convention on the Continental Shelf. Note, Jurisdictional Problems Created by Artifi-
cial Islands, 10 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 638, 652-53 (1973).
154. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1501-1524 (1976).
155. S. REP. No. 93-1217, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 75, 78 (letter from W. Vincent
Rakestraw, Ass't Atty. Gen., to Sen. Warren Magnuson, Chairman of Sen. Comm. on
Commerce), reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 7529, 7597; Comment,
Territorial Status of Deepwater Ports, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 603 (1978).
156. Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-
372, § 202, 92 Stat. 629 (amending 43 U.S.C. § 1332(2)).
157. S. REP. No. 93-1217, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in [1974j U.S. CODE
CONG. & An. NEWS 7529, 7531-32.
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off their coasts. 51 All such state laws must be administered and
enforced by the appropriate officers and courts of the United
States. '51
The purpose of these provisions in the OCSLA was to de-
fine a body of law applicable to the seabed and structures of
the outer continental shelf.6 0 Congress foresaw that develop-
ment of the shelf would require a legal framework more exten-
sive than that provided by the United States Code. The Act
was thus designed to adopt state law in order to fill voids in the
federal statutory scheme.'' However, state laws may not be
applied directly to activities on the shelf; the Supreme Court
in Rodrigue v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co." 2 held that
"federal law is 'exclusive' in its regulation of this area, and that
state law is adopted only as surrogate federal law."'6 3
Although Congress' primary concern in enacting the state
law adoption provisions may have been with providing civil law
for offshore structures, and most cases to date have involved
only such issues,'6 4 the clear language of the acts would make
state environmental laws applicable as well. Moreover, adop-
tion of state environmental laws would be consistent with con-
gressional policies: Congress was not concerned with preserving
uniformity of law applicable to all continental shelf struc-
158. 33 U.S.C. § 1518(b) (1976); Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act Amend-
ments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-372, § 203, 92 Stat. 629 (amending 43 U.S.C. §
1333(a)(2)) provides:
To the extent that they are applicable and not inconsistent with this
subchapter or with other Federal laws and regulations of the Secretary
now in effect or hereafter adopted, the civil and criminal laws of each
adjacent State, now in effect or hereafter adopted, amended, or repealed
are declared to be the law of the United States for that portion of the
subsoil and seabed of the outer Continental Shelf, and artificial islands
and fixed structures erected thereon, which would be within the area of
the State if its boundaries were extended seaward to the outer margin of
the outer Continental Shelf, and the President shall determine and pub-
lish in the Federal Register such projected lines extending seaward and
defining each such area. All of such applicable laws shall be administered
and enforced by the appropriate officers and courts of the United States.
State taxation laws shall not apply to the outer Continental Shelf.
159. 33 U.S.C. § 1518(b) (1976); Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act Amend-
ments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-372, § 203, 92 Stat. 629 (amending 43 U.S.C. §
1333(a)(2)).
160. Rodrigue v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 395 U.S. 352, 355 (1969).
161. Id. at 358.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 357; Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 100 (1971).
164. E.g., 395 U.S. 352; 404 U.S. 97.
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tures;'1 Congress was, however, concerned with maintaining
local environmental control. The 1978 OCSLA amendments
provide that
the rights and responsibilities of all States and, where ap-
propriate, local governments, to preserve and protect their
marine, human, and coastal environments through such
means as regulation of land, air, and water uses, of safety,
and of related development and activity should be consid-
ered and recognized .... "I
Thus, in the absence of federal regulations on point, state
air pollution regulations should be deemed applicable to struc-
tures on the outer continental shelf if they are consistent with
federal law. As noted earlier, state regulations should rarely
conflict with the Clean Air Act."6 7 The question of conflict with
other federal laws could, of course, still be raised. State laws
that required sources to control emissions in such a manner as
would violate federal safety regulations might be unenforcea-
ble. Or a state law that in effect prohibited all drilling on the
outer continental shelf could be viewed as an infringement on
the federal scheme of leasing drilling rights.'
In the case of valid state regulations, the major drawback
for the states is that enforcement of their "federalized" regula-
tions must be accomplished by federal agencies. But other than
a loss of local control, no unusual problems should arise under
such a procedure since the Environmental Protection Agency
has often enforced state air pollution laws pursuant to section
113 of the Clean Air Act.'
CONCLUSION
This comment has examined the jurisdictional issues in-
volved in state assertion of authority to regulate pollution
sources located on the high seas. The issues are twofold: First,
what are the ramifications of such regulation according to in-
165. Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. at 104.
166. Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-
372, § 202, 92 Stat. 629 (amending 43 U.S.C. § 1332).
167. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 7401-7642 (West Supp. Pamph. 1977); see text accompany-
ing note 130 supra.
168. Cf. Union Oil Co. of Cal. v. Minier, 437 F.2d 408 (9th Cir. 1970) (state
nuisance law may not be used to frustrate federal leasing authority by enjoining oil
drilling operations on the outer continental shelf).
169. 42 U.S.C.A. § 7413 (West Supp. Pamph. 1977).
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ternational law? Second, can an individual state usurp the
powers of the federal government in such matters? The Califor-
nia Air Resources Board's Model Lightering and New Source
Review Rules squarely address these questions.
State regulations of extraterritorial vessels should be con-
stitutionally sustained, for the states have retained a sufficient
residuum of sovereignty to control activities on the high seas.
Such legislation, if within the realm of health or pollution con-
trol, will only be struck down if unjustifiably burdensome on
foreign relations or commerce, or if in irreconcilable conflict
with federal laws. The validity of state laws regulating struc-
tures on the outer continental shelf will depend primarily on
their consistency with federal laws. Although such local regula-
tions can only be enforced by federal agencies, this should not
create any insurmountable practical difficulties.
Extraterritorial pollution regulation is also valid under
general principles of international law. According to customary
international law, a nation may assert jurisdiction on several
bases. The most fundamental basis for jurisdiction is the terri-
torial principle, under which a country possesses plenary juris-
diction over all matters occurring within its territorial limits.
This principle has been extended to allow the assertion of juris-
diction over extraterritorial actions whose effects are felt within
the nation. Although the courts have apparently never used
this concept for pollution control, all indications suggest that
it is an internationally acceptable method of obtaining jurisdic-
tion over polluters on the high seas.
The policies underlying the ARB's assertion of authority
over vessels are strikingly persuasive. Coastal nations the world
over are presently faced with the unconscionable pollution of
their territories by poorly regulated foreign ships. Effective in-
ternational and flag nation controls have proved to be lacking.
Regulation of such vessels by the affected countries, who are
uniquely motivated and familiar with the problems, is a defi-
nite step toward enhanced worldwide environmental quality.
Peter M. Greenwald
1979]

